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Testing the Opportunistic Approach to Monetary Policy 
 
1. Introduction 
Empirical models of monetary policy are widely used to study interest 
rates and to investigate the objectives of policymakers.  The great majority of 
studies use the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993). This is a simple linear relationship in 
which desired real interest rates adjust in each period to eliminate a fixed 
proportion of the gap between actual and desired values of inflation and output.   
Recently, however, there has been increasing dissatisfaction with the Taylor rule.   
In part, this is due to concerns about whether Taylor rules are optimal, as some 
authors argue that policymakers can do better by following alternative rules (e.g. 
Svensson, 2003).   But there are also concerns that the Taylor rule is too 
restrictive, suggesting that a more sophisticated approach to the empirical 
modeling of monetary policy may provide new insights.  Given the importance of 
models of monetary policy to the academic and wider policy communities, 
evaluation of these alternative approaches is important. 
One possible alternative is the Opportunistic Approach to Monetary Policy 
(Opportunistic Approach), developed by Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) and 
Aksoy et al (2005).  Originally prompted by comments by members of the 
Federal Open Market Committee, the Opportunistic Approach has two main 
features.  The best-known feature is the argument that policymakers should take 
aggressive action when inflation is some way from its desired level but should 
otherwise give greater priority to output.   This is formalized using the concept of 
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the zone of discretion, a range of values for the inflation rate around the desired 
rate. It is argued that policymakers should raise real interest rates when inflation 
is above the zone of discretion and cut real interest rates when inflation is below 
the zone.  When inflation is inside the zone, policymakers should behave 
opportunistically by accommodating shocks that tend to move inflation towards 
the desired level but not otherwise responding to shocks until the boundaries of 
the zone of discretion are reached.  A second feature of the approach is the 
argument that policymakers should attempt to move inflation towards an 
intermediate inflation target that reflects both the desired inflation rate (or inflation 
target) and the inflation rate inherited from the previous period.   
This approach implies a more subtle response to macroeconomic events 
than with the linear Taylor rule. Policymakers respond aggressively when 
inflation threatens to move some way from the desired level but respond more 
passively when inflation only deviates from the desired level by a smaller 
amount. Arguably, the Opportunistic Approach also has similarities with 
“constrained discretion” as advocated by Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) and 
Bernanke (2003)1.  Thus far, the literature has viewed the Opportunistic 
Approach as a recommendation for how policymakers ought to behave rather 
than as a description of how policymakers have actually behaved in practice. 
This paper, by contrast, will examine whether policymakers’ behavior has been 
consistent with the Opportunistic Approach.   
                                                   
1 As described by Bernanke (2003), constrained discretion consists of “a strong commitment to 
low and stable inflation” and, subject to this, “striving to limit cyclical swings in resource 
utilisation”. 
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 We begin by testing whether policymakers have been using an 
intermediate inflation target.  Doing this requires only a slight extension of the 
familiar Taylor rule model of monetary policy.  We then assess the prediction that 
policymakers respond more aggressively when inflation is outside the zone of 
discretion by considering the model of the Opportunistic Approach proposed by 
Aksoy et al (2005).  This requires a three-regime model in which the behavior of 
interest rates depends on whether inflation is expected to be within, above or 
below the zone of discretion.  We assess the suitability of such a model by 
testing the previously estimated Taylor rule for the effects of neglected non-
linearity, using a test that is known to be sensitive to the type of nonlinearity 
implied by the Opportunistic Approach.   We then present estimates of the model 
before considering related models that relax some of the assumptions of the 
model of Aksoy et al (2005). 
 We estimate our models using US data for the period 1983Q1-2004Q1 
and using real-time output data.  We find strong empirical support for the 
Opportunistic Approach.  Introducing an intermediate inflation target into an 
otherwise standard Taylor rule improves the fit of the model.  The structural 
nonlinear model implied by the Opportunistic Approach fits the data better than a 
Taylor rule.  In our preferred model, a slightly amended version of the model of 
Aksoy et al (2005), we find that the zone of discretion is symmetric, extending 
from 1% below the desired inflation rate to 1% above.   These estimates suggest 
that key features of the Opportunistic Approach are reflected in the behavior of 
policymakers.  
 5
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 outlines the 
model of Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) and Aksoy et al (2005) and suggests 
how it might be estimated.  Section 3 presents estimates of a Taylor rule, a 
Taylor rule augmented by an intermediate inflation target and the model of Aksoy 
et al (2005), arguing that the latter model is not superior to the augmented Taylor 
rule.  Section 4 suggests how some of the restrictions imposed by the model of 
Aksoy et al (2005) might be relaxed and presents estimates that suggest this 
modified model provides the best fit to the data.  Section 5 reports estimates 
based on alternative measures of the data.  Section 6 discusses the implications 
of the opportunistic approach.  Section 7 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Foundations of the Opportunistic Approach to Monetary Policy 
Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) analyse the model2 
 
(1) 2 2( ) ( )IL y abs yπ π γ ψ= − + +  
 
(2) et t styπ π α ε= + +  
 
(3) 0 ( *)t t dty r rσ σ ε= − − +  
 
                                                   
2 Minford and Srinivasan (2006) develop an alternative theoretical model of opportunistic behavior 
relying on adaptive expectations and asymmetry in the Phillips curve. 
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where π is the inflation rate, πI is the intermediate inflation target, y is the output 
gap, πe is expected inflation, r is the real interest rate, r* is the equilibrium real 
interest rate, α , 0σ  and σ  are positive parameters, εs is a supply shock and εd is 
a demand shock. 
Equation (1) describes the loss function of policymakers.  The loss from 
inflation is a quadratic function of the difference between inflation and the 
intermediate inflation target.   The loss from output includes a linear function of 
the absolute value of the output gap. Equation (2) is a static expectations-
augmented Phillips curve while equation (3) is a simple, static aggregate demand 
relationship.  Assuming that policymakers choose the optimal interest rate for 
period t  at the end of period (t-1) using information available up to the end of 
period (t-1), the optimal monetary policy rule proposed in Orphanides and Wilcox 
(2002) is then   
 
(4) 
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⎧ ⎫= + − +⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪− ≤ − ≤⎪ ⎪= + − + +⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎨ ⎬− > −⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪= + − − +⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪< −⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 
 
where i* is the equilibrium nominal interest rate.  Equation (4) is a non-linear 
monetary policy rule in which, the behavior of policymakers is described by three 
Taylor-like policy rules depending on whether inflation is expected to be above, 
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below or within the zone of discretion, which extends from δ  percentage points 
above the intermediate inflation target to δ  percentage points below.  Interest 
rates respond to the expected output gap with a coefficient of yρ .  The response 
of interest rates to inflation depends on whether inflation is expected to be 
outside the zone of discretion.  If it is, the response of interest rates to inflation is 
OZDρ ; if it is not, the response is ZDρ .  If OZD ZDρ ρ≠ , the response to inflation is 
not constant, so modeling monetary policy using a Taylor rule would not be 
appropriate.  We would expect OZD ZDρ ρ> , so the response to inflation is 
stronger outside the zone of discretion.  Aksoy et al (2005, pp 4-5) comment, “the 
marginal loss from a small output gap is of much greater importance to the 
Central Bank than the loss due to a small deviation of inflation from it’s 
intermediate inflation target.  Thus…{in the zone of discretion}…output 
stabilisation is the primary concern to the opportunistic policymaker.  Larger 
deviations of inflation from the intermediate target, however, cause the 
policymaker to focus on inflation stabilisation”.    This implies OZD yρ ρ>  and 
y ZDρ ρ> .   We also note that if 0ZDρ = , then policymakers have a target range 
for inflation as they will seek to move inflation to the edges of the zone of 
discretion but will not seek to move inflation towards the intermediate inflation 
target once inflation is within the zone.  If OZD ZDρ ρ= , then the model simplifies to  
 
(5) * 1 1( )
I
t t t t y t ti i E E yπρ π π ρ− −= + − +  
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while if we replace the intermediate inflation target in (1) with the inflation target, 
Tπ , then the model further simplifies to the Taylor rule 
 
(6) * 1 1( )
T
t t t y t ti i E E yπρ π π ρ− −= + − +  
 
Finally, we note that although these models assume interest rates respond to the 
current values of inflation and the output gap, it would not be difficult to amend 
the assumptions of the model to produce forward-looking versions of the 
behavioral relationships in (4)-(6). 
 
3. Testing the Opportunistic Approach to Monetary Policy 
 
 In this section we assess the Opportunistic Approach using US data for 
the period 1983Q1-2004Q1.  The sample corresponds to the chairmanships of 
Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan, but excludes the period when the Federal 
Reserve targeted non-borrowed reserves, rather than interest rates3.  The 
interest rate is measured by the effective federal funds rate and inflation is the 
annual proportional change in the CPI.  We use real time output data from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia and measure the output gap as the 
deviation of this from a Hodrick-Prescott (1997) trend.  
We begin by estimating simple linear Taylor rules.  To allow for the high 
degree of interest rate smoothing that has been observed in previous studies, we 
assume 
                                                   
3 Rudebusch (1998) points out that it is hard to estimate a stable US policy rule for the whole 
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(7) 1 ˆ(1 )t i t i ti i iρ ρ−= + −  
 
where iˆ  is the desired interest rate, given by 
 
(8) * 1 1ˆ ( )
T
t t t y t ti i E E yπρ π π ρ− −= + − +  
 
Combining (7) and (8) and invoking rational expectations, our empirical model is 
 
(9) *1 (1 ){ ( ) }
T
t i t i t y t ti i i yπρ ρ ρ π π ρ ε−= + − + − + +  
 
where ε  is an error term composed of the various expectational errors in (9).   
The restrictions embodied in (9) allow us to estimate the Taylor rule using GMM.   
Column (i) of Table 1 present estimates of this model.  We estimate that ρi=0.92 
and that ρπ=1.76, which are similar to that found in previous estimates (e.g. Judd 
and Rudebusch, 1998, Clarida et al, 2000).  We estimate that  ρy=2.41 which is 
higher than usual4.  Column (ii) of Table 1 presents estimates of a forward-
looking version of this model, given by  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
postwar period. 
4 In a special issue of the North American Journal of Economics and Finance devoted to “Real-
time data and monetary policy”, Gerberding et al (2005) and Gerdesmeier and Roffia (2005) find 
that the use of real-time output data as opposed to ex-post output data increase the output effect 
in the Taylor rule for the Bundesbank and the EU area, respectively. A possible explanation is 
that the magnitude of the response using revised data could suffer from downward bias owing to 
the errors-in-variables problem. 
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(10) *1 1 1 1(1 ){ ( ) }
T
t i t i t t y t t ti i i E E yπρ ρ ρ π π ρ ε− − + −= + − + − + +  
 
Although the estimates are broadly similar (we estimate ρi=0.89, ρπ=2.10 and 
ρy=2.00), the forward-looking model fits the data better.  However both models 
fail a parameter stability test. 
 We next estimate models that use the intermediate inflation target in place 
of the inflation target.  To do this, we model the desired interest rate using  
 
(11) * 1 1ˆ ( )
I
t t t t y t ti i E E yπρ π π ρ− −= + − +  
 
where we define the intermediate inflation target as 
 
(12) 
1
1{ } (1 )
n
I T
t t j
jn
π μ π μ π−
=
= + −∑  
 
This model simply adds the intermediate inflation target to an otherwise standard 
Taylor rule to give an empirical counterpart to (5).  We absorb the inflation target 
into the constant and do not seek to identify this at this stage.  Column (iii) of 
Table 1 presents estimates of this model (where we use n=4), while column (iv) 
of Table 1 presents estimates of a forward-looking version of this model, given by   
 
(13) *1 1 1 1 1(1 ){ ( ) }
I
t i t i t t t y t ti i i E E yπρ ρ ρ π π ρ− − + + −= + − + − +  
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We note that both versions of the model produce broadly similar estimates but 
that the forward-looking model is again superior. In column (iv) we estimate that 
μ=0.59 and find that the null hypothesis H0: μ=0 is clearly rejected by the data.  
Comparing estimates in columns (iii) and (iv) with estimates in columns (i) and 
(ii), the inclusion of the intermediate inflation target improves the empirical fit of 
the model but has little effect on the estimates of other parameters.  These 
results suggest that policymakers have an intermediate inflation target and thus 
provide support for this aspect of the Opportunistic Approach.  However the 
estimates continue to fail parameter stability. 
The second aspect of the Opportunistic Approach in which the behavior of 
policymakers differs according to whether inflation is expected to lie within the 
zone of discretion, implies that the models in Table 1 are misspecified, since they 
ignore the implied regime switching behavior of policymakers.  We therefore test 
the estimated models in Table 1 for the presence of non-linearities. The last three 
rows of Table 1 report Hamilton’s (2001) λ-test, and the λA and g-tests proposed 
by Dahl and González-Rivera (2003).  Under the null hypothesis of linearity, 
these are Lagrange multiplier test statistics following the χ2  distribution (a brief 
description of these tests is given in the Appendix of the paper) 5.  These tests 
are powerful in detecting non-linear smooth transition behavior (Dahl and 
González-Rivera, 2003). This is of particular interest as we shall use smooth 
transition specifications below.  All three tests reject linearity.  
                                                   
5 We run the tests using Gauss codes obtained from Hamilton’s web page at: 
http://weber.ucsd.edu/~jhamilto/software.htm#other. To account for the rather small sample, we 
report bootstrapped p-values of the three tests based on 1000 re-samples. 
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Having rejected linearity, we next consider the model 
 
(14)  
*
1 1 1
1
*
1 1 1
1
*
1 1 1
1
(1 ){ ( ) }
{ ( ) }
(1 ){ ( ) }
{ ( )}
(1 ){ ( ) }
{ ( )}
I
t i t i ZD t t t y t t
I
t t t
I
t i t i OZD t t t y t t
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t t t
I
t i t i OZD t t t y t t
I
t t t
i i i E E y
if E
i i i E E y
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i i i E E y
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ρ ρ ρ π π ρ
δ π π δ
ρ ρ ρ π π δ ρ
δ π π
ρ ρ ρ π π δ ρ
δ π π
− − −
−
− − −
−
− − −
−
⎧ = + − + − +
− ≤ − ≤
= + − + − + +
− > −
= + − + − − +
< −
⎫⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 
 
This is the model of Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) in (4) adapted to incorporate 
interest rate smoothing.  Preliminary estimates consistently found no response to 
inflation within the zone of discretion; setting ρZD=0 improved the efficiency of the 
estimates and so this is imposed in the estimates of the model reported in 
column (i) of Table 2.  The results are mixed.  The estimates of iρ , yρ  and μ are 
similar to those reported in Table 1; the latter confirming the support for the 
intermediate inflation target that was reported in Table 1.  The response to 
inflation outside the zone of discretion is very large, ρOZD=9.24, while there is no 
response to inflation within the zone.   We estimate that δ=1.01, so the zone of 
discretion extends from 1 percentage point above the intermediate inflation target 
to 1 percentage point below.  The implied width of 2 percentage points for the 
zone of discretion seems reasonable.  We cannot reject the hypotheses ρZD<ρy 
and ρOZD>ρy, so the evidence supports a key prediction of the Opportunistic 
Approach, that policymakers respond more strongly to output inside the zone of 
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discretion but more strongly to inflation outside the zone.   The estimates pass a 
parameter stability test, in contrast to the estimates in table 1).  The standard 
error is lower than the Taylor rule in column (iii) of Table 1 but higher than the 
forward-looking Taylor rule of column (iv) of Table 1.  This suggests that a 
forward-looking version of this model might be preferable.  Column (ii) of Table 2 
presents estimates of such a model, given by 
 
(15)  
*
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
*
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
*
1 1 1 1 1
(1 ){ ( ) }
{ ( ) }
(1 ){ ( ) }
{ ( )}
(1 ){ ( )
I
t i t i ZD t t t y t t
I
t t t
I
t i t i OZD t t t y t t
I
t t t
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t i t i OZD t t t y t t
i i i E E y
if E
i i i E E y
if E
i i i E E y
ρ ρ ρ π π ρ
δ π π δ
ρ ρ ρ π π δ ρ
δ π π
ρ ρ ρ π π δ ρ
− − + + −
− + +
− − + + −
− + +
− − + + −
= + − + − +
− ≤ − ≤
= + − + − + +
− > −
= + − + − − +
1 1 1
}
{ ( )}It t tif Eδ π π− + +
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪< −⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 
This model has a lower standard error than the models in Table 1 and has a 
lower response to inflation outside the zone of discretion. 
 
4. Refinements and Robustness of the Opportunistic Approach 
The estimates in the previous section suggest that the Opportunistic Approach to 
monetary policy has empirical support, especially when modified to allow for a 
forward-looking response to inflation.  In this section we consider refinements of 
this approach, investigating whether the empirical fit of the model can be 
improved.  Our first refinement allows a smoother transition between regimes.  
We consider the model 
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(16)  
*
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
*
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
*
1 1 1 1 1
(1 ){ ( ) }
{ ( ) }
(1 ){ ( ) }
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(1 ){ ( )
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− − + + −
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− − + + −
= + − + − +
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= + − + − + +
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1 1 1
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{ ( )}It t tpr Eδ π π− + +
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪< −⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 
 
Equation (16) differs from (15) in that the regimes are weighted by the probability 
of being in each regime.  Equation (16) is a smooth transtion model, in which the 
movement between regimes is less abrupt than in (15).  We model the 
probabilities in (16) using the logistic functions (see e.g. van Dijk et al, 2002) 
 
(17a)  
1 1 1 ( )1 1 1
1 1 1 ( ) /
1{ ( )} 1
1
I
t t t IEt t t
I
t t t E
pr E
e π π
γ π π δ σδ π π − + + −− + +− + + − − +− > − = − +
 
and 
(17b)  
1 1 1 ( )1 1 1
1 1 1 ( ) /
1{ ( )}
1
I
t t t IEt t t
I
t t t E
pr E
e π π
γ π π δ σδ π π − + + −− + +− + + − − −< − = +
 
 
In (17a) and (17b), the smoothness parameter γ > 0 determines the smoothness 
of the transition regimes.  We follow Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) and 
Teräsvirta (1994) in making γ  dimension-free by dividing it by the standard 
deviation of 1 1 1( )
I
t t tE π π− + +− . 
Preliminary estimates again found no response to inflation within the zone 
of discretion and that setting ρZD=0 improved the efficiency of the estimates; this 
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restriction is imposed in the estimates of the model reported in column (iii) of 
Table 2.  The estimates are similar to those in column (ii) of Table 2 but the 
standard error is lower.   
 Our second refinement develops the smooth transition model in (16) by 
simplifying the model.  The model considered so far assumes that interest rates 
respond to 1 1 1( )
I
t t tE π π δ− + +− +  when the economy is below the zone of 
discretion, and to 1 1 1( )
I
t t tE π π δ− + +− −  when it is above.  If we assume instead 
that interest rates respond to 1 1 1( )
I
t t tE π π− + +− , then we can simplify the model to 
 
(18) 
*
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
(1 ){ ( )
(1 ) ( )}
I
t i t i y t t t ZD t t t
I
t OZD t t t t
i i i E y E
E
ρ ρ ρ θ ρ π π
θ ρ π π ε
− − − + +
− + +
= + − + + −
+ − − +
 
 
where 1 1 1{ ( ) }
I
t t t tpr Eθ δ π π δ− + += − ≤ − ≤  is the probability that the economy is 
within the zone of discretion.  Equation (18) is similar to the modified Taylor rule 
in (13) except that the response to inflation is contingent on whether inflation is 
within the zone of discretion.   We model the probability of being within the zone 
using the quadratic logistic function (see e.g. van Dijk et al, 2002) 
 
(19) 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 ( )1 1 1
1 1 1 [ ( )][ ( )]/
1{ ( ) } 1
1
I I
t t t t t t IEt t t
I
t t t t E E
pr E
e π π
γ π π δ π π δ σθ δ π π δ − + + − + + −− + +− + + − − + − −= − ≤ − ≤ = − +
 
 
As before, preliminary estimates found no response to inflation within the 
zone of discretion and we again imposed ρZD=0, to improve the efficiency of our 
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estimates, which are reported in column (iv) of Table 2. The estimates of the 
model are similar to those before, except that the response to inflation is lower 
and arguably more plausible: ρOZD=3.59.  The standard error is substantially 
lower than those of other models.  This simplified version of the model fits the 
data better than other models and continues to provide support for the 
Opportunistic Approach. 
 Our final refinement relaxes the assumption that the zone of discretion is 
symmetric around the intermediate inflation target.  To do this, we use equation 
(18) and express the probability of being in the zone of discretion as 
 
(20) 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 ( )1 1 1
1 1 1 [ ( )][ ( )]/
1{ ( ) } 1
1
I L I U
t t t t t t IEt t t
L I U
t t t t E E
pr E
e π π
γ π π δ π π δ σθ δ π π δ − + + − + + −− + +− + + − − + − −= − ≤ − ≤ = − +
 
 
In (20) the zone of discretion extends from Uδ  percentage points above the 
intermediate target to Lδ  percentage points below it.  Estimates of this model are 
presented in column (v) of Table 2.  These are similar to those of the model in 
column (iv) of Table 2.  We estimate that Uδ =1.03 while Lδ =1.06.  We cannot 
reject the restriction that U Lδ δ= and so conclude that the zone of discretion is 
symmetric.6     
 
                                                   
6 For the smoothness parameter, γ , we run a grid search over the [0.5, 300] range of numerical 
values. For columns (iii)-(v) of Table 2, we selected γ =10.  Although we would have liked to 
estimate γ  as a free parameter, this proved problematic; accurate estimation of γ  requires many 
observations in the immediate neighbourhood of the regime boundaries. Furthermore, large 
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5. Robustness analysis 
We investigated the robustness of our results by assuming n=1 in 
equation (12) for the intermediate inflation target and by using alternative 
measures of the output gap.  These were obtained by applying the Hodrick-
Prescott filter to the final real GDP series as a measure of potential output and by 
taking the difference between the logarithm of final real GDP and the logarithm of 
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) measure of potential GDP.  Further, we 
measured expected inflation by the annual one-period ahead mean forecasts 
obtained by the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF)7.  Columns (i) to (iv) of 
Table 3 report the alternative estimates of the model in (18) using the quadratic 
logistic function (20) which allows for an asymmetric zone of discretion.  The 
estimates are similar to those of column (iv) in Table 2 although with a much 
smaller response to the output gap when final output data are used; the output 
response is insignificant when the CBO measure of potential output is used8.  
These alternative estimates provide empirical support for the Opportunistic 
Approach and confirm our finding that zone of discretion is symmetric. 
The Hodrick-Prescott filter is a two-sided symmetric filter in the sense that 
it uses data on past and future output symmetrically to decompose each output 
observation.  The HP filter is optimal (in the expected squared error sense) for 
the midpoint of the output series but not for the endpoints of the series where it 
                                                                                                                                                       
changes in γ  have a small impact on the shape of the functions (17a), (17b), (19) and (20), 
which implies that the γ  estimate does not need be precise (van Dijk et al, 2002). 
7 These were obtained from the web site of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia at: 
http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/spf/index.html. 
8 This points to a downward bias owing to the errors-in-variables problem when revised data are 
used (see footnote 4). 
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becomes increasingly one-sided; this affects the efficiency properties of the filter.  
To correct this, Mise et al (2005a,b) suggest the construction of the output gap by 
applying the Hodrick-Prescot filter to a forecast-augmented output series.  
Garratt et al (2005) generate these forecasts using (i) a univariate model of the 
real-time output and (ii) a bivariate vector autoregression which estimates jointly 
real-time output data and its revisions.  Garratt et al (2005) argue that the joint 
modeling of real-time output and its revisions avoids the problem of overstating 
the revision effects in the published output data if these revision effects have 
been anticipated.  Columns (v) and (vi) of Table 3 present estimates using these 
alternative measures of the Hodrick-Prescott output series.  These estimates are 
very similar to those of our preferred model in column (iv) of Table 2, so allowing 
for possible weaknesses in our measure of the output gap makes little difference 
to our estimates. 
 
6. Implications of the Opportunistic Approach 
The Opportunistic Approach provides a richer account of monetary policy 
than the familiar Taylor rule.  In particular, the response to inflation varies over 
time, in contrast to the constant response implied by the Taylor rule.   Although 
the average response to inflation across our sample is 1.89, which, as we would 
expect, is similar to the estimates of the Taylor rules in columns (i) to (iv) of Table 
1, the response to inflation implied by the Taylor rule is highly misleading.  In 
practice, interest rates were either far more responsive to inflation or else did not 
respond at all.   
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Figure 1 illustrates the difference between the opportunistic model and the 
Taylor rule model by depicting the deviation of interest rates from equilibrium as 
a function of the inflation gap.   While the response implied by the Taylor rule is 
linear, the response of the opportunistic approach is nonlinear.  Interest rates do 
not respond to inflation within the zone of opportunism; but as the edge of the 
zone is approached, a response to inflation emerges rapidly, quickly over-taking 
the response implied by the Taylor rule.  In this, there are clear similarities with 
the inflation zone targeting model of Orphanides and Weiland (2000).  Figure 2 
further illustrates the difference between the models by plotting the marginal 
response of interest rates to inflation (
1 1 1( )
t
I
t t t
di
dE π π− + +− ) implied by our estimates 
for each data point.  While the Taylor rule implies a constant marginal response, 
the opportunistic model implies a marginal response of zero within the zone of 
opportunism but which rapidly rises to a level greater than that of the Taylor rule 
as inflation approaches and crosses the boundaries of the zone. 
 The implications of the Opportunistic Approach for US monetary policy 
over the past 25 years are illustrated in Figure 3a), where we plot expected 
inflation, the intermediate target, the zone of discretion and the long-run time-
varying impact of inflation on interest rates.  The graph assumes an inflation 
target of 2%; this reflects the original assumption of Taylor (1993) which appears 
to have become the consensus view on the desired inflation rate.  There are 
frequent changes in the intermediate inflation target, which fluctuates between 
highs of 4% in 1983 and 1991 and lows of just over 2% in 1986 and late 2001.  
Expected inflation remained within the zone of discretion for most of the sample 
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period, but exceeded the upper bound in 1984, 1988-1990 and came close to 
doing so in 2000 and 2002.  Expected inflation came very close to the lower 
bound in 1987 and briefly fell below the bound in late 2001.   
 Fluctuations in expected inflation around the intermediate target are 
mirrored in the estimated time-varying response of inflation to the expected 
inflation rate.  This is calculated (using the estimates in column (iv) of Table 2) 
as: 
 
(21) (1 )t t ZD t OZDπρ θ ρ θ ρ= + −  
 
As Figure 3b) shows, the weight on inflation effect reaches 3.59 when expected 
inflation approaches or exceeds the bounds of the zone of discretion. This 
happens in 1984, in 1987-1990, and in late 2001.  On the other hand, the impact 
of inflation is much less when expected inflation moves further within the zone of 
discretion, and drops to zero when expected inflation is close to the intermediate 
target in late 1986, from late 1991 up to 1998, in early 2001 and after 2003.  
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7. Conclusions 
 
The Opportunistic Approach to Monetary Policy is an influential but 
untested model of optimal monetary policy.  We provide the first tests of the 
model, using US data from 1983Q1-2004Q1.   
 Our results support the Opportunistic Approach.  We find that 
policymakers respond to the gap between inflation and an intermediate target 
that reflects the recent history of inflation.  We find that there is no response of 
interest rates to inflation when inflation is within 1% of the intermediate target but 
a strong response when inflation is further from the intermediate target.  
These estimates are only a first attempt to test the Opportunistic 
Approach.  But they do show that behavior of policymakers is more subtle and 
complex than assumed in the familiar Taylor rule.  Further research around these 
issues may well prove fruitful. 
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Appendix: Non-linearity tests 
 
Hamilton’s (2001) λ-test and the λA and g-tests proposed by Dahl and González-
Rivera (2003) draw on the assumption that the conditional mean function of the 
dependent variable is stochastic and therefore unobservable or unknown to the 
econometrician.  The testing procedure is based on the regression 
 
yt = β0+x′t β1+λm(g⊗ xt)+ error 
 
The conditional mean of the dependent variable is a function of a linear and a 
non-linear component.  The linear component is given by x′t β1 where xt is a k-
dimensional vector of the explanatory variables (excluding the intercept term).  
The non-linear component is given by λm(g⊗ xt), where m(.) is a k-dimensional 
system of random variables depending on the distance amongst the elements of 
the xt vector, and ⊗  denotes element-by-element multiplication.  The scalar λ 
proxies the contribution of the non-linear part to the conditional mean, whereas g 
is a k-dimensional vector capturing the curvature of the conditional mean.  The 
null hypothesis of linearity involves testing the null hypothesis H0: λ2 = 0 for the λ 
and λA tests and the null hypothesis H0: g = 0k for the g-test.  These are 
Lagrange multiplier test statistics following the χ2  distribution (for more technical 
details see Hamilton, 2001, and Dahl and González-Rivera, 2003). Dahl and 
González-Rivera (2003) report simulation evidence according to which (i) their 
tests are more powerful than Hamilton’s original test when the dimensionality of 
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the model (in terms of parameters to be estimated) increases, and (ii) their tests 
are powerful in detecting smooth transition specifications.  The latter is important 
as the opportunistic models we consider in this paper are smooth transition-type 
models.  
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Table 1 
Estimates of Taylor rules and augmented Taylor rules 
GMM estimates on US data, 1983Q1-2004Q1 
 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
     
ρi 0.92 (0.03) 0.89 (0.03) 0.93 (0.02) 0.89 (0.02) 
ρπ 1.76 (0.63) 2.10 (0.46) 1.81 (0.56) 2.16 (0.55) 
ρy 2.41 (0.89) 2.00 (0.65) 2.39 (0.98) 2.18 (0.79) 
μ   0.64 (0.24) 0.59 (0.27) 
     
     
s.e. 0.490 0.473 0.481 0.461 
F-stability (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
J-stat (p-value) 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.56 
λ-test (p-value) 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 
λA-test (p-value) 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 
g-test (p-value) 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of the estimates. s.e. is 
the regression standard error. J stat is a chi-square test of the model’s 
overidentifying restrictions (Hansen, 1982). The instruments are a constant and six 
lags of the variables in the estimated rule. Parameter stability is an F test of 
parameter stability (see Lin and Teräsvirta, 1994, and Eitrheim and Teräsvirta, 
1996).  The table also reports bootstrapped p-values of the λ, λA, and g tests 
based on 1000 re-samples.   
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Table 2 
Estimates of the Opportunistic Approach 
GMM estimates on US data, 1983Q1-2004Q1 
 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
      
ρi 0.89 (0.07) 0.92 (0.11) 0.92 (0.02) 0.92 (0.02) 0.91 (0.02) 
ρZD      
ρOZD 9.24 (4.89) 6.01 (1.49) 6.40 (1.95) 3.59 (0.73) 3.60 (0.74) 
ρy 2.56 (2.11) 2.47 (0.95) 2.37 (0.74) 2.62 (0.41) 2.60 (0.41) 
μ 0.62 (0.10) 0.62 (0.11) 0.63 (0.09) 0.63 (0.09) 0.63 (0.14) 
δ  1.01 (0.23) 1.10 (0.24) 1.05 (0.08) 1.05 (0.08)   
Lδ      1.06 (0.19) 
Uδ      1.03 (0.10) 
s.e. 0.467 0.460 0.456 0.419 0.419 
F-stability  
(p-value) 
0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 
J-stat  
(p-value) 
0.32 0.34 0.35 0.32 0.35 
      
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of the estimates. s.e. is 
the regression standard error. J stat is a chi-square test of the model’s 
overidentifying restrictions (Hansen, 1982). The instruments are a constant and six 
lags of the variables in the estimated rule. Parameter stability is an F test of 
parameter stability (see Lin and Teräsvirta, 1994, and Eitrheim and Teräsvirta, 
1996).   
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Table 3 
Estimates of the Opportunistic Approach based on alternative measures 
GMM estimates on US data, 1983Q1-2004Q1 
 
 (i) 
Estimates 
using n=1 
 
(ii) 
Final output 
data 
(iii) 
CBO 
measure of 
output 
(iv) 
SPF 
measure of 
inflation 
(v) 
Univariate 
HP forecast 
augmented 
output 
(vi) 
Bivariate 
HP forecast 
augmented 
output 
       
ρi 0.93 (0.03) 0.92 (0.03) 0.94 (0.02) 0.93 (0.03) 0.94 (0.02) 0.93 (0.03) 
ρZD       
ρOZD 3.33 (0.81) 3.07 (1.07) 3.73 (1.05) 4.28 (1.31) 3.57 (1.20) 3.31 (0.94) 
ρy 2.79 (0.42) 1.25 (0.61) 0.49 (0.41) 1.94 (0.79) 2.51(0.81) 1.81 (0.71) 
μ 0.65 (0.06) 0.64 (0.10) 0.71 (0.03) 0.66 (0.11) 0.64 (0.09) 0.63 (0.08) 
Lδ  1.06 (0.02) 0.86 (0.14) 1.05 (0.01) 0.96 (0.18) 1.02 (0.02) 0.97 (0.01) 
Uδ  1.05 (0.01) 0.88 (0.10) 1.03 (0.01) 0.99 (0.10) 1.01 (0.01) 0.96 (0.01) 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of the estimates. 
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Figure 1:  Deviations of interest rates from equilibrium as a function of the 
inflation gap 
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Note:  The figure plots the deviation of interest rates from equilibrium due to the 
inflation gap implied by the estimates in column (iv) of Table 1 and column (iv) of 
Table 2.  The curves are given by gapπρ π  in the case of the Taylor rule and  
by [ (1 ) ]t ZD t OZD gapθ ρ θ ρ π+ −  for the opportunistic model, where gapπ  is the 
inflation gap.  The shaded area represents the zone of discretion. The lower 
bound is gapπ δ−  and the upper bound is gapπ δ+  using the estimates in 
column (iv) of Table 2.  
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Figure 2: The marginal response of interest rates to changes in inflation 
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Note: The shaded area represents the zone of discretion. The lower bound is 
1 1 1( )
I
t t tE π π δ− + +− −  and the upper bound is 1 1 1( )It t tE π π δ− + +− +  using the 
estimates in column (iv) of Table 2. The nonlinear inflation effect is equal to 
(1 )t t ZD t OZDπρ θ ρ θ ρ= + − , whereas the linear inflation effect is equal to πρ  using 
2.16πρ =  from column (iv) of Table 1. To facilitate comparison in the same 
graph, the horizontal axis of Figure 2 uses μ=0.63 to construct the inflation gap. 
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Figure 3: The time-varying impact of inflation on the US interest rate using Tπ = 2 
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 (b) Time-varying inflation effect and the US interest rate 
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Note: The figure plots expected inflation ( 1 1t tE π− + ) together with the intermediate target 
1 1 1 1
1
1{ } (1 )
n
I T
t t t t j
j
E E
n
π μ π μ π− + − + −
=
= + −∑ , the lower bound 1 1It tE π δ− + −  and the upper 
bound 1 1
I
t tE π δ− + +  using n=4, μ= 0.63, Tπ =2 and δ =1.05 based on the estimates in column (iv) of 
Table 2. The inflation effect is equal to (1 )t t ZD t OZDπρ θ ρ θ ρ= + − . LHS axis for Figure 3b: 
measurement units of the inflation effect; RHS axis: measurement units of the interest rate. 
 
